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Research seminar 6

Research Seminar Series

"International Environmental Agreements and Game Theory"

by Eftichios S. Sartzetakis

Associate Professor of Environmental Economics

Department of Economics, University of Macedonia

Friday, October 21, 2011, 16:00-17:00

International Hellenic University, Lecture Room A1

The School of Economics and Business Administration of the International Hellenic University (IHU) would like to invite you to the next presentation in the Research Seminar Series. Eftichios Sartzetakis, Associate Professor at the University of Macedonia, Department of Economics, will present his working paper entitled “International Environmental Agreements and Game Theory”.

The purpose of the Research Seminar Series is to bring together the academic and business community by presenting contemporary research topics in Finance, Business, Marketing, Accounting and Economics, among others. Through these seminars, as an international centre of knowledge, innovation and research, at the crossroads of Southern Europe, the IHU attempts to further strengthen its strategic role in academic excellence. Drawing on the experience of outstanding Greek and international academics, working papers are presented on a regular basis, with the aim of establishing a meeting point for active researchers.


Speaker information:

Before joining University of Macedonia in 2001, Eftichios Sartzetakis was an Associate Professor at Thompson Rivers University, B.C., Canada where he served as a chairperson of the Department of Economics. Previously he has taught at Carleton University, Université Laval and University of British Columbia His research interests focus on the design of environmental policies such as environmental tax reforms, tradable emission permit systems and environmental information provision; international environmental agreements; adoption of new environmentally friendly technologies, the effects of environmental regulations on competitiveness, environments management and sustainable development. He has published a number of papers in leading academic journals, among which the International Journal of Industrial Organization, the Journal of Public Economic Theory, the Environmental and Resource Economics, and the Journal of Regulatory Economics; he has presented his work in many international conferences and academic institutions; he served as member of scientific committees for many international conferences; he is a member of the Editorial Board of the Environment and Development Economics and he has refereed for almost all leading international journals on environmental economics. He is a member of international academic organisations such as, the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists and the Canadian Resource and Environmental Economics Study Group. He is leading a number of research projects on environmental economics and management, among which the Environmental Management System of the University of Macedonia which is certified by EMAS. He served as Lead Author in a number of committees and international projects, such as the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, and national projects such as the Bank of Greece’s Study Group for the Impact of Climate Change. He served as expert advisor to private firms and public authorities both in Canada and in Greece including the Bureau of Competition Policy and the Ministry of Environment in Canada and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Environment Energy and Climate Change in Greece.

Associate Professor Sartzetakis can be reached by e-mail at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it


Working Paper Short Abstract:

International environmental agreements (IEAs) aim at controlling global environmental problems, forming thus, a special case of the public good provision problem. Although the socially optimum outcome requires that all countries sign the agreement, each country has an incentive to free ride on the cooperating efforts of the rest of the signatories. This incentive stems from the fact that the costs avoided by not abating outweigh the marginal environmental damage caused on the country, when every other country agrees to control its emissions. In our work we offer two analyses: one where countries always act alone whether they are joining or withdrawing from an agreement and one where any group of countries may choose to coordinate their actions in either joining or withdrawing from an agreement. We show that the new (coalitional) farsighted stable coalitions are much larger than those the previous models supported. In this manner, we explain better the fact that IEAs are already ratified by a large number of countries while we provide formal arguments that would encourage an even larger number of countries to join in.

If you wish to download the working paper’s extended abstract follow the link:
Working Paper Short Abstract.

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